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The "Proper"-And By That I Mean Limited-Role
for Economists in Price-Fixing Litigation
David Marx, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
I often have said that in my next life, I want to return as a testifying
economist. There are two reasons I came to that conclusion. First, the
hourly rates of testifying economists-which I have consistently found
to be remarkably similar across the major economic consulting firms-
are even higher than those of the lawyers who retain them! And,
second, they are even less accountable than the lawyers for the results
of their work product.
As you probably can discern, I hold some strong opinions about the
role of economists in antitrust cases. Those opinions derive from my
experience that in most cases the economic testimony presented by the
opposing parties-and I am speaking of economic theory and the
claimed application of that theory to the facts-tends to cancel itself
out. Simply put, antitrust litigants spend a considerable amount of time,
resources, and money on economic testimony that adds little net value
to the case. Worse, that testimony may have the effect of distracting the
fact-finder's attention from the facts, disputed or not, which are what I
believe should really matter in antitrust cases.
I have found that to be true in Sherman Act section 1,1 Sherman Act
section 2,2 and Clayton Act section 73 cases, as well as during different
. David Marx, Jr., is a partner in McDermott, Will & Emery LLP, where he heads the firm's
Chicago Antitrust & Competition Practice Group. Mr. Marx's practice focuses on antitrust
litigation and counseling, particularly relating to antitrust matters in the health care industry.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000). Reflecting back on the preliminary injunction hearing (which
ultimately was treated as a full trial on the merits pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 65(a)(2)) in United
States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1990), I believe that Judge Gerhard Gesell
(a prominent antitrust lawyer before becoming a federal district court judge) limited the parties to
two live witnesses each at the hearing in the hope that neither party would designate their
economist as a witness. In fact, neither party did and the economic "testimony" was presented by
affidavits submitted by each party in support of their respective positions on the government's
motion to enjoin Tampella's acquisition of certain of Baker Hughes' assets. Judge Gesell's
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
phases of antitrust litigation-in the context of motions for class
certification and for summary judgment on the merits. I seem to be
encountering these problems with economic testimony most often today
in the context of Sherman Act section 1 conspiracy cases where the
issue is whether the defendants acted independently and unilaterally in
their individual economic self interest or engaged in anticompetitive
concerted action. Of course, economic testimony is not really
necessary-except as to damages-if there is direct evidence of an
agreement between the defendants.
And, as I usually represent a defendant that is alleged to have
conspired, I am particularly troubled by the Seventh Circuit's ruling in
High Fructose Corn Syrup,4 which has the potential, at least in this
circuit, to make it almost impossible for defendants in oligopolistic
markets to prevail on a motion for summary judgment in a conscious
parallelism case. And that is what I want to address briefly with this
article.
II. THE ROLE OF ECONOMIC TESTIMONY IN
CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM CASES
The Introduction to Chapter 6 of the Sedona Conference
Commentary on the Role of Economics in Antitrust Law-entitled
Economics and Proof of Concerted Action 5-frames the issues well:
It is therefore important to distinguish between coordination and
agreement. Coordination, in which firms act with knowledge and
expectations of what their rivals are doing, may properly be
considered a prerequisite for agreement, and can be inferred from a
multitude of factors on which an economic expert might appropriately
opine. (For example, evidence as to concentration and entry barriers
might be relevant, as might simulation modeling.) Agreement,
however, under the present state of the law, requires more than mere
coordination. In addition, the trier of fact must be able to conclude
that it is more likely than not that the particular outcome could not
have been reached absent negotiation through some form of
communication, either verbal or nonverbal. This is what distinguishes
mere price leadership and coordination from agreement. 6
opinion dismissing the government's complaint does not refer to either economist's affidavit.
4. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002), petition for
rehearing en banc denied, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 16149.
5. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, WORKING GROUP ON THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS IN
ANTITRUST, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY ON THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS IN
ANTITRUST LAW (Feb. 2006), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org.
6. Id. at 75.
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Coordination and agreement are different-factually and legally. But
I do not agree with the Sedona Conference Commentary's statement
that an economist may be able to opine on the distinction between mere
price leadership and coordination from agreement "by analyzing
whether a particular outcome is too complex to have arisen plausibly
through price leadership, but would instead have required greater
communication than simple price signaling would permit.' 7 It is just
not clear to me that economists should have anything to say about that
issue.
I feel the same way about expert testimony as to whether action is
contrary to individual economic self-interest in the absence of
agreement. Again, that is an issue about which economists should not
be rendering opinions.
The appropriate witnesses to testify about these issues are the
businesspeople who made the pricing decisions on behalf of their
companies. They should be able to explain their decision-making
process and the bases for their pricing decisions and, subject to cross-
examination-into which the economists surely will have considerable
input-those witnesses are much more probative on the issues than
expert economic testimony.
Moreover, the expert testimony in these cases tends, unfortunately, to
focus more on the conclusion-whether there was an agreement or
not-than the issues which might be more useful or helpful to the fact-
finder, such as whether a market or industry is conducive or susceptible
to a price-fixing conspiracy. And that is what troubles me-when an
economist testifies that the conduct could not have occurred or the
prices could not have been set without an agreement (tacit or otherwise)
between the parties. To be fair, I am no less troubled when an
economist testifies to the opposite conclusion, as well; that is, that in his
or her opinion there was no agreement. In either case, these conclusions
are beyond the purview and expertise of a testifying economist.
III. BAKER V. JEWEL FOOD STORES
Let me provide just one example of why I am skeptical of economic
testimony in conscious parallelism cases. If you live in or around
Chicago, you probably have shopped at a Jewel or Dominick's grocery
store. A few years ago, Jewel and Dominick's, the two leading (some
would say dominant) retail grocery store chains in the Chicago area,
were alleged to have fixed the price at which they sold milk in their
7. Id.
2007]
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grocery stores in the metropolitan Chicago area. I won't bore you with
all of the factual details of the case (which are public),8 but I will
provide some factual context before discussing the economic testimony
which illustrates why I want to be a testifying economist, not a lawyer,
the next time around.
The underlying facts were not in dispute. They were that:
Jewel and Dominick's each sold two brands of milk-a premium
brand and a "value" brand-and offered four different types of each-
whole, skim, 2%, and 1%.
Both Jewel and Dominick's sold their premium brand at the same
price in all of their stores. Their pricing of the value brand of milk
varied depending on the level of competition among grocery stores
locally, but there were between eight and ten different price points at
which they sold their value brands of milk at their stores around the
city.
Both Jewel and Dominick's ran promotions on milk, usually $1 off
the shelf price, though only on their premium brand, and at different
times and with different frequencies (Dominick's promoted its milk
more often than Jewel did).
Lots of milk was sold on promotion-about thirty percent of Jewel's
milk and forty-eight percent of Dominick's milk was sold at prices
below the shelf price.
The evidence showed that the shelf prices for premium milk at Jewel
and Dominick's stores essentially "matched" over a two-year time
period, and that if either changed the price, the other did, too, almost
immediately.
There was no direct evidence of an agreement-no contacts or
communications between those involved in either setting milk prices
(the Dairy Products Manager) or determining when promotions would
occur.
Also-and this is very important-there was no dispute as to how
Jewel and Dominick's set their milk prices. The cost of milk-the price
that Jewel and Dominick's paid for it-changed once a month. When
that occurred, Jewel took that cost and determined what its retail price
would have to be in order to achieve a target gross margin for milk.
And that was the price Jewel set for its premium milk across the chain.
Jewel used a simple, formulaic calculation based upon its cost and
8. See Baker v. Jewel Food Stores, Inc., 2003-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 73,964 (111. Cir. Ct.
2003), aff'd, 823 N.E.2d 93 (111. App. Ct. 2005) (holding that there was insufficient evidence to
show price fixing).
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desired gross margin. Jewel used the same process to set its milk price
each month. If there was a nominal change in the cost, Jewel would not
change its price, but if the cost moved much, Jewel would adjust its
retail shelf price to achieve its targeted gross profit margin. Price
changes usually took effect on the first Monday of a month (consistent
with when the cost change was effective).
There also was no dispute as to how Dominick's set its milk prices.
On the first Monday of each month (or after a change in cost was to be
effective), Dominick's sent price checkers into every Jewel store to
check Jewel's posted shelf price for milk, and Dominick's matched
Jewel's price! One additional fact is relevant. There were rare
occasions when the cost of milk decreased during the time period for
which price data existed. Jewel and Dominick's did not always reduce
their prices when that happened, usually because the cost reduction was
nominal. There was one occasion, however, when Jewel did reduce its
price and Dominick's immediately followed.
Against this factual background, what role could-should-
economic testimony play?
Plaintiffs had three experts. First, there was an economist who
testified that the posted retail shelf prices for the defendants' premium
brands of milk were the same (a fact not really disputed). He did not
take into consideration Jewel's or Dominick's $1-off promotions-they
were irrelevant for his analysis. This economist also speculated-
testified-about damages.
Second, plaintiffs called a marketing expert to opine that the market
was conducive to price-fixing: it was concentrated; the defendants'
market shares were stable; the defendants were able to exchange their
retail price information by engaging in regular price-checks of each
other's stores; and barriers to entry into the grocery store market in
Chicago were extremely high. Finally, this expert testified that
Chicago's prices for milk were higher than most every other city in the
country.
Finally, plaintiffs called an economist to discuss economic theory-
the Bertrand model, if my memory serves me correctly. He testified
that the retail shelf prices that Jewel and Dominick's posted for milk
could only have been set as a result of a cartel and that any price greater
than the parties' marginal cost was anticompetitive.
Defendants, of course, had three experts, too. First, defendants
retained an expert for data analysis; to show, among other things, that
transaction prices that consumers actually paid for milk differed
2007]
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considerably between Jewel and Dominick's (due to the $1-off
promotions that plaintiffs' expert ignored as irrelevant).
Defendants' retained a second economic expert to address marketing,
pricing, and promotion issues relevant to competition between grocery
stores and between grocery stores and other sellers of milk (which was
just about everyone who sells anything!). Those other sellers included,
for example, convenience stores, pharmacies, and gas stations, to name
but a few.
Finally, defendants had a third expert to testify about the economic
theory-oligopoly versus cartel. He was prepared to opine that
defendants' conduct was consistent with the operation of an oligopoly.
The facts suggested that Jewel and Dominick's had engaged in
unilateral, interdependent behavior that was not cooperative. In other
words, their conduct and prices were not consistent with the existence
of a cartel.
What was the end result? This was a bench trial (before a state court
judge because the plaintiffs' complaint was based on the Illinois
Antitrust Act, 9 not the Sherman Act). At the conclusion of plaintiffs'
case, the judge dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the
plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving the existence of an
unlawful agreement.
I fear, however, that had this case been heard in federal court and a
district court judge granted summary judgment to the defendants, the
Seventh Circuit might have reversed, based on its decision in High
Fructose Corn Syrup, which, in my view, suggests that courts should
arrogate economic theory over the facts.
I commend you to the article by David Meyers, entitled "The Seventh
Circuit's High Fructose Corn Syrup Decision-Sweet for Plaintiffs,
Sticky for Defendants," which appeared in the Fall 2002 issue of
Antitrust Magazine, in which he discusses this issue in considerably
more depth. As you might have guessed, I tend to agree with his
characterization of the HFCS decision as "sufficiently outside the
mainstream of most other courts' application of Matsushita."10
Which, I think, brings us back to where we started.
9. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/3 (2002).
10. David Meyers, The Seventh Circuit's High Fructose Corn Syrup Decision-Sweet for
Plaintiffs, Sticky for Defendants, ANTITRUST, Fall 2002, at 67, 72.
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